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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 43252 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) TWIN FALLS COUNTY NO. CR 2014-7667 
v.     ) 
     ) 
THOMAS E. BUCK,   ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Thomas E. Buck pled guilty to one count of 
aggravated assault and one count of possession of a controlled substance, 
methamphetamine.  He received a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed, 
and the court retained jurisdiction.  On appeal, Mr. Buck contends that the district court 
abused its discretion by relinquishing its jurisdiction, and by failing to reduce his 
sentence or place him on probation in light of the additional information submitted in 




Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
On July 21, 2014, thirty-three year old Thomas Buck pointed an airsoft gun at the 
driver of a Hyundai Elantra and told him “The car’s been paid for, leave the keys.”  
(R., pp.13-14.)  Apparently Mr. Buck was trying to help out a friend who had just had 
foot surgery.  (R., p.15.)  Mr. Buck’s friend had purchased the Elantra from the driver, 
but the driver “repossessed” the car when Mr. Buck’s friend failed to make the final 
payment.  (R., pp.14-15.)  When law enforcement arrived, Mr. Buck was searched and a 
plastic bag containing a substance that later tested positive for methamphetamine was 
located in his pocket.  (R., p.15.)   
Mr. Buck was charged by information with one count of aggravated assault, with 
a deadly weapon sentencing enhancement, and one count of possession of a controlled 
substance, methamphetamine.  (R., pp.66-68.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Buck pled guilty to one count of aggravated 
assault and one count of possession of methamphetamine.  (11/17/14 Tr., p.17, Ls.1-
24; R., p.119.)  As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend 
concurrent sentences of five years, with three years fixed, but that the district court 
retain jurisdiction.  (11/17/14 Tr., p.4, Ls.5-14; R., p.108.)  The district court accepted 
the plea, but did not order a Presentence Investigation (hereinafter, PSI) or a mental 
health assessment as defense counsel represented that he intended to waive the 
preparation of any investigation or evaluation in order to hasten Mr. Buck’s sentencing 
hearing.  (11/17/14 Tr., p.18, Ls.9-18, p.19, L.6 – p.21, L.9; 11/24/14 Tr., p.4, Ls.8-12; 
R., p.119.)  The defense stipulated to the sentences recommended by the State.  
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(11/17/14 Tr., p.19, Ls.6-9.)  The matter was set for sentencing.  (11/17/14 Tr., p.21, 
Ls.6-10; R., p.120.)   
At the sentencing hearing, the district court followed the stipulations of the parties 
and sentenced Mr. Buck to an aggregate unified term of five years, with two years fixed, 
but retained jurisdiction over him for a period of up to 365 days.  (11/24/14 Tr., p.6, L.19 
– p.8, L.19; R., pp.122-128.)   
Thereafter the district court relinquished jurisdiction without a hearing and 
ordered Mr. Buck to serve the underlying sentence previously imposed.  (R., pp.134-
138.)  Mr. Buck filed a timely Notice of Appeal.  (R., pp.141-143.)   
Mr. Buck then filed timely pro se I.C.R. 35 Motion (hereinafter, Rule 35) seeking 
a reduction of his sentence.  (R., pp.150-152.)  The district court denied Mr. Buck’s Rule 
35 motion without a hearing.  (R., pp.163-166.)  Mr. Buck timely appeals from the order 
relinquishing jurisdiction, and the district court’s order denying Mr. Buck’s I.C.R. 
35 motion.   
 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over 
Mr. Buck? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Buck’s Idaho 






The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over 
Mr. Buck 
 
Before the district court relinquishes jurisdiction over a defendant, it must 
evaluate whether probation would be appropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.  State v. 
Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001).  “The decision to place a defendant on probation or 
whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the 
sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an 
abuse of that discretion.”   State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288-289 (Ct. App. 
2010).  Upon review of a sentence following a period of retained jurisdiction, this Court 
reviews the entire record, encompassing events both before and after the original 
judgment.  Id. at 289. 
Mr. Buck contends the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing 
jurisdiction without a hearing where it specifically relied on several documents, including 
“the presentence investigation in this case.”  (R., p.134.)  However, this reliance is 
plainly incorrect as a PSI was not prepared in Mr. Buck’s case.1  Thus, the district court 
                                            
1 Because defense counsel agreed to waive the preparation of a PSI and a mental 
health evaluation, Mr. Buck, who had been previously been diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia, ADD/ADHD, PTSD, Bi-Polar Disorder, Anti-Social Disorder, and 
Depression, proceeded to the custody of Idaho Department of Correction and was 
placed on a period of retained jurisdiction without information about his background or 
the severity of his mental health conditions.  Mr. Buck was subsequently removed from 
the retained jurisdiction programming due in large part to his mental health issues.  
Should this Court grant Mr. Buck relief by placing him on probation, a presentence 
investigation will need to be prepared prior to placement on probation as required by 
I.C. § 20-220.  
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based its decision to relinquish jurisdiction, in part, on a document that was never 
created.     
The district court failed to recognize that Mr. Buck was making progress while on 
the retained jurisdiction and his accomplishments would lead to a successful probation.  
This district court found that “the Defendant’s choice to refuse to meaningfully 
participate in the programming recommended by CAPP staff indicates that the 
Defendant is not a candidate for probation at this time” and relinquished its jurisdiction 
over Mr. Buck.  (R., p.136.)  The district court found that “the Defendant simply refuses 
to learn from the programming offered to him” (R., p.136); however, this is not a 
reasonable conclusion after considering the totality of the information contained in the 
APSI. 
Although Mr. Buck received two formal disciplinary sanctions while on his rider, 
much of his problematic conduct was due to his mental health conditions.2  (APSI, p.3.)  
While the first DOR was for behavior, specifically, Mr. Buck was being argumentative 
with a corrections officer and refused to redirect his behavior, the second DOR Mr. Buck 
received was due to his possession of a prescription pill.  (APSI, p.3.)  As he explained, 
“I hid one of my pills to take in the morning because I was having anziete attcts [sic] in 
the A.M.”  (APSI, p.3.)  Mr. Buck was removed from programming a short period of time 
after the second DOR.  (APSI, p.4.) 
While the district court did accurately note that on March 11, 2015, Mr. Buck 
reportedly asked his counselor for permission to “just do the bare minimum in the 
program,” Mr. Buck did complete some of the work in this class before he was removed 
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for his second DOR.  (APSI, pp.4.)  On March 27, 2015, it was noted that Mr. Buck was 
becoming more aware of his feelings and the physical cues associated with both 
positive and negative feelings.  (APSI, p.10.)   
Before Mr. Buck received the DORs, he was making progress in his 
programming.  According to his counselor, Mr. Buck “had started accepting feedback 
from his peers and was compliant in class.”  (APSI, p.4.)  Mr. Buck was open and willing 
to participate in group and was a good group member.  (APSI, p.13.)  He had been 
made the Classroom Bathroom Monitor, as voted by his peers.  (APSI, p.12.)  
Additionally, Mr. Buck was realizing and admitting that his methamphetamine use was a 
big problem in his life.3  (APSI, p.4.)  He “committed to using thought stoppers regularly 
in order to help him cope with his faulty beliefs and cravings.”  (APSI, p.4.)  Mr. Buck 
demonstrated a willingness to change and his number one goal was to stay clean.  
(APSI, p.13.)  Mr. Buck exhibited good progress during the time he was in the rider 
program, and was more than 50% of the way through his classes when he was 
removed from programming.  (APSI, pp.4, 8-9.)   
At the time of his guilty plea, Mr. Buck was taking prescribed medications to 
manage his mental health conditions.  (11/17/14 Tr., p.5, L.24 – p.6, L.3, p.6, L.24 – p.7, 
L.23.)  Mr. Buck suffers from paranoid schizophrenia and has difficulty discerning reality 
from non-reality without the proper dosage of medication.  (11/17/14 Tr., p.7, Ls.5-23.)  
Mr. Buck wrote to the district court during his rider to say that his mental health 
medications had been adjusted and he was feeling the best he had ever felt.  (APSI, 
                                                                                                                                            
2 Mr. Buck had been diagnosed with ADD/ADHD, PTSD, Bi-Polar Disorder, Anti-Social 
Disorder, Depression, and Schizophrenia.  (R., p.110.) 
3 Mr. Buck starting using methamphetamine at age 13.  (APSI, p.13.) 
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p.7.)  Mr. Buck asked the district court to place him on probation or in mental health 
court.  (ASPI, p.7.) 
The district court relinquished its jurisdiction over Mr. Buck even though he had 
been making progress in his programming and exhibited a desire to change his criminal 
thinking and behavior.  (APSI, p.4.)   
In light of all of the mitigating evidence that was presented to the district court 
that demonstrates Mr. Buck’s significant rehabilitative potential, the district court abused 
its discretion when it relinquished its jurisdiction over Mr. Buck. 
  
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Buck’s Rule 35 Motion For 
A Sentence Reduction In Light Of The New Information Submitted  
 
 A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which 
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.  State v. Trent, 
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).  “The criteria for examining rulings denying the 
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original 
sentence was reasonable.”  Id.  “If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, 
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional 
information presented with the motion for reduction.  Id.   
  Mr. Buck contends the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing its 
jurisdiction over him and that his sentence should have been reduced in light of the new 
information submitted in conjunction with his Rule 35 motion.  Mr. Buck asserts the 
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district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence modification represents an abuse of 
discretion. 
 Several mitigating factors are present in Mr. Buck’s case, all of which indicate 
that a more lenient sentence would be appropriate, particularly in light of factors such 
as:  Mr. Buck’s mental health conditions, his drug addiction, and the fact that Mr. Buck 
was grieving the loss of his wife.4  (R., p.151.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires 
the trial court to consider a defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing factor.  Hollon v. 
State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).  Here, Mr. Buck suffers from schizophrenia and he 
was not taking his mental health medications when he committed the instant offenses.  
(R., p.151.)   
In addition to his mental health issues, Mr. Buck struggles with an addiction to 
controlled substances.  (R., p.151.)  The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance 
abuse should be considered as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court 
imposes sentence.  State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982).  In Nice, the Idaho Supreme 
Court reduced a sentence based on Nice’s lack of prior record and the fact that “the trial 
court did not give proper consideration of the defendant’s alcoholic problem, the part it 
played in causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for 
treating the problem.”  Id. at 91.  Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that 
ingestion of drugs and alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of 
conduct, could be a mitigating circumstance.  State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 
(1981).   
                                            
4 Mr. Buck had utilized the grief and loss programming while on his rider.  (APSI, p.7.) 
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Finally, Mr. Buck had ample time in prison to reflect on his bad choice and bad 
behavior.  (R., p.151.)  Mr. Buck wants to be an asset to the community, a good role 
model, and a productive member of society.  (R., p.151.)   
In light of Mr. Buck’s mental health issues, his controlled substance abuse, and 
the new information before the district court regarding his resolve to change his life, the 
district court should have reduced his sentence or placed him on probation. 
 Based on the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the district 
court at the time of sentencing, it is clear the district court abused its discretion in failing 
to reduce Mr. Buck’s sentence in response to his Rule 35 motion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Buck respectfully requests that this Court remand this case with an order that 
he be placed on probation.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the 
district court for a new rider review hearing or that this Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate.   
 DATED this 8th day of October, 2015. 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      SALLY J. COOLEY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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